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Abstract
The need for developed countries to take a lead in the global fight against climate change is generally
acknowledged and was intrinsic to the 2015 Paris climate change agreement. An understanding of the
way in which environmental policy in advanced nations has developed and which policies have had
a significant impact on the reduction in the emissions of various pollutants may yield important pol-
icy prescriptions relevant to the current climate change negotiations. In this paper we consider how
Japan’s little-known environmental interest rate policy and voluntary pollution control agreements con-
tributed to Japan’s ecological modernization and how these policies compare with the more traditional
regulatory approach. Our results show that Japan’s use of an environmental interest rate policy was an
effective policy as a complement to the more traditional regulatory approach.
1. Introduction
A wide range of policies is now being used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and re-
duce environmental degradation both locally and globally. The most prominent and well-
known policies are taxes, quotas, and cap and trade mechanisms, which we might think
of as sticks. What is often overlooked, however, is the considerable degree of support,
which we can think of as the carrots, that governments provide to industries and firms to
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help them reduce their environmental footprint and to encourage environmental innova-
tion. Such support includes direct subsidies, reduced interest rate financing, regulation
breaks, and price support. Despite the complexities associated with subsidies and their
associated distortions, they continue to be part of the government toolkit, although more
often than not governments have tended to resort to sticks when it comes to incentivizing
firms to reduce their emissions of local and global pollutants.
In this paper we revisit the debate on how best to reduce industrial emissions by con-
sidering the example of Japan in the early 1970s when Japan made rapid progress on the
reduction of pollution and quickly established itself as a country with one of the clean-
est environments in the OECD (OECD 2000, 2002). Specifically, we examine the impact of
two policies that were particular to Japan on its subsequent environmental performance.
The first is Japan’s policy of providing low interest rate financing to firms to invest in pol-
lution abatement technologies. The second is the widespread use of voluntary pollution
control agreements (PCAs) where firms sign a pollution reduction agreement with local
government and local communities. Although much attention has been given to the ef-
fectiveness of environmental regulation and other “sticks” to reduce pollution, we ask
whether Japan’s environmental interest rate policy is the forgotten hero when it comes to
explaining Japan’s impressive environmental performance, or whether instead the dis-
tortions induced by these environmental subsidies have been responsible for additional
pollution by aiding the continued survival of firms in Japan’s traditional dirty industries.
By analyzing the effectiveness of Japan’s environmental interest rate policy we hope to
provide insight into whether such a policy should be considered as part of the global pol-
icy armory against local and global pollutants.
The decades from the 1950s to the 1970s represent an ideal period to study Japan for two
additional reasons. First, this was a period of rapid growth for Japan coupled with se-
vere air and water pollution problems and pollution-related health damage.1 Second,
given that many other parts of the world, including China and India, are currently go-
ing through similar experiences of rapid industrialization and urbanization leading to
significant negative pollution-induced externalities, there may be some important policy
implications for those rapidly developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
A policy of growing first and cleaning up later risks significant damage to the long-term
growth prospects of these regions, and of course to their environments as well. What is
evident from the case of Japan during our period of study is that it is possible to address
1 The most widely cited example of pollution-related health damage is Minamata disease—a toxic
disorder of the central nervous system caused by methyl mercury compounds from chemical fac-
tories contaminating fish in and around Minamata bay. The final death count was 1,542 (Ministry
of the Environment 1997). Estimates of the costs of compensation are close to 100 billion yen paid
annually for victims of pollution (Committee on Japan’s Experience in the Battle against Air Pollu-
tion 1997, 45).
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problems of pollution while continuing to grow rapidly. That is, it provides an example of
how to ecologically modernize (Barrett 2005; Imura and Schreurs 2005).
Both of our environmental policies of interest—the policy of offering reduced interest rate
financing for environmental investment and the use of PCAs—have been previously dis-
cussed in the environmental economics literature, although the majority of studies have
tended to be descriptive in nature. Early studies examining the policy of lowering inter-
est rates include Miyamoto (1989, 203–205) and Lee (1999). For a comprehensive review
of the environmental policy in Japan see Imura and Schreurs (2005). Lee (1999) considers
several interest rate subsidy schemes as part of the zaito system (Japanese fiscal system)
and provides some descriptive evidence to show that interest rate subsidies did help to
promote investment in abatement technologies.2 Although similar to Lee (1999), we also
provide a simple analysis to help clarify the effectiveness of Japan’s policy of providing
interest rate subsidies.
Turning to PCAs, which are voluntary agreements between the local government and
businesses, a small number of studies have attempted to study their effectiveness (Gresser
Fujikura, and Morishima 1981; Tsutsumi 2002). In a survey of PCAs, Matsuno (2007) con-
cludes that PCAs vary across municipalities in terms of scale, quality, and enforcement
and then finds that traditional industrial pollution problems were largely controlled by
the use of PCAs and were shown to be most effective in the reduction of sulphur oxides.3
Before continuing, we briefly describe the theoretical and empirical literature that exam-
ines the impact of subsidies on the environment more broadly. The theoretical literature
on the role of subsidies in an environmental context is limited and has tended to con-
centrate on input and output subsidies on intermediate inputs and exports, respectively,
and not on subsidies to encourage environmental investment or innovation. For example,
van Beers and van den Bergh (2001) use a static partial equilibrium model to show how
emissions are increased with output subsidies in a small open economy. A second study
by Kelly (2009) develops a general equilibrium model to show that the extent to which
subsidies cause emissions to rise depends on relative emission intensities and the incen-
tives to pollute for the subsidized industry versus the industry that would otherwise get
the resources.
2 Lee (1999) conducts one simple econometric analysis: (total abatement) = α (amount of lending) +
β (tax deduction in abatement investment) + γ (interest rate gap subsidy) + ε. He finds that
lending is a significant and positive determinant of total abatement and that the interest rate
gap is positive and weakly significant before 1980, although the effect of a simple tax deduction
is insignificant.
3 Other studies of PCAs include Matsuno and Ueta (2002) and Noda (2015). A wider literature that
examines the role of self-regulation and the impact on environmental performance (see, e.g., Arora
and Cason 1995, 1996; Pargal and Wheeler 1996; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000; Videras and
Alberini 2000; Nakamura et al. 2001; Anton Deltas, and Khanna 2004).
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The empirical literature on the effects of subsidies on environmentally sensitive industries
is also limited and also tends to concentrate on those subsidies that are in place as part
of industrial or competition policy and not as a means to improve the environment. As
such, what evidence there is suggests that sectors such as agriculture, fishing and energy,
manufacturing, transport, and water are all heavily subsidized (Barde and Honkatukia
2004). Barde and Honkatukia (2004) and Kelly (2009) go on to discuss the channels by
which input and output subsidies affect the environment. The first channel is through
tax relief, cash subsidies, or (more recently) bank bailouts—protecting the least efficient
producers (which within a sector are likely to be the most pollution-intensive). Second,
input and output subsidies in environmentally sensitive industries tend to encourage
the overuse of dirty inputs, and third, regulatory relief increases the incentives for firms
to pollute by lowering production costs. Finally, subsidies can be used in the traditional
sense to protect domestic firms from competition. The possible distortions caused by these
types of subsidies are why negotiations ahead of any new trade agreement tend to call
for a reduction in subsidies paid to firms. For example, Bajona and Kelly (2012) estimate
that China’s removal of subsidies as part of the process of joining the WTO resulted in the
reduction of three of the four pollutants that they studied.4
It is worth noting that, as with the manufacturing sector, subsidies can also have positive
and negative effects in the agricultural sector (Pasour, Rucker, and Gardner 2005). In this
case, subsidies to farmers may encourage, on the one hand, the additional use of fertil-
izers and pesticides, but on the other hand, may pay farmers to remove environmental
sensitive areas from extensive farming.5
When discussing environmental policy in Japan it is important to remember that Japan
was relatively late to industrialize and hence suffered significantly as a result of rapid in-
dustrialization made worse by a high population density and high levels of urbanization
(which meant that residential areas were often situated close to industrial areas). It took
a number of environmental scandals and protests against Japan’s perceived weak envi-
ronmental policy before anything changed (Imura and Schreurs 2005). As a consequence,
both the government and industry were forced to change (law, management style, pro-
grams), resulting in Japan having one of the most advanced environmental programs in
the world.6
4 Other related studies for China include Wang and Jin (2007) and Wang et al. (2003), who find that
China’s state-owned enterprises are more polluting but also have more bargaining power over
compliance respectively.
5 A related literature examines the impact of subsidised fossil fuels that are used to ensure that en-
ergy prices are kept low for both firms and consumers (Pitt 1983; Cheon, Urpelainen, and Lackner
2013; Burniaux and Chateau 2014). Both the World Bank and the IMF have recommended that
such subsidies should be phased out over time (Durand-Lasserve et al. 2015).
6 Whereas we know that historically Japan’s regulatory regime was successful in reducing emis-
sions of local pollutants, similar strategies in China and elsewhere have not been considered as
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To briefly summarize our results, we find that the use of an environmental interest rate
policy did have a significant impact on reductions in abatement expenditure in Japan for
one of our three lending institutions and that it appears to be more effective than the use
of PCAs at the municipality level. Although the main driver of Japan’s transition from
polluter to one of the OECD’s least-polluting countries per capita was direct regulation (as
evidenced by the 1993 Basic Environmental Law), it is clear that the interest rate subsidy
did result in considerable sums of money being funnelled into firms to use for environ-
mental innovation and abatement investment, which significantly sped up the adoption
and implementation of cleaner technologies. If such a policy were to have a similar effect
in China or India it could result in significant reductions in both local and global pollu-
tants, depending on which sectors were targeted. The recent introduction of a large num-
ber of green financing initiatives across the world shows that the global community has
accepted that policies to encourage the adoption of green technologies have an important
role to play alongside more traditional forms of environmental regulation.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the methodology
and describes our data; Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. Methodology and data
We begin this section with a detailed discussion of our two policies of interest. Following
a series of environmental disasters in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan has been at the forefront
of environmental regulation. In the 1970s six new environmental laws were enacted and
a further eight were tightened. The 1990s saw a further tightening of environmental leg-
islation, and in 1993 Japan implemented what became known as the Basic Environment
Law. In 1997 Japan hosted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which re-
sulted in the Kyoto Protocol and thrust international environmental issues to the forefront
of Japan’s industrial policy. In 2001 a Ministry of the Environment was established, incor-
porating the previous roles of the Environment Agency, taking environmental policy into
the heart of government decision making. The culmination of these various policies is that
Japan established one of the strongest frameworks for achieving a clean and healthy envi-
ronment earlier than most OECD countries and demonstrated that a good environmental
successful. The relatively poor performance is often blamed on a lack of effective enforcement,
which is often a problem when the regulatory regime is mainly based on the use of sticks. See
Economy (2004) for a discussion of the issue of enforcement in China.
7 An example of “green finance” includes pay-as-you-save, whereby loans to fund energy efficiency
improvements are repaid from the resulting energy bill savings (and hence have little impact on
government spending). Venture capitalists have also become increasingly interested in supporting
green technology companies. Other examples include green investment banks, carbon finance,
public–private partnerships, and tax increment financing. The recent financial crisis, however, has
still left many firms unable to access the funds needed for investment.
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reputation is not only good for the environment but is also a valuable economic and cul-
tural asset (Sumikura 1998).8
Although the current environmental literature tends to concentrate on cap and trade,
taxes, and command and control policies, a little-known method used in Japan in the
early 1970s was the environmental interest rate differential. The aim of the environmen-
tal interest rate subsidy program was to encourage firms to invest in abatement tech-
nologies to reduce emissions. Abatement investment includes technology to reduce air
pollution (such as desulphurization), water pollution, noise pollution, recycling, and
industrial waste. A gap caused by arbitrarily setting lower interest rates for certain fi-
nancial schemes than the current market rates can be considered as a subsidy for abate-
ment investment. There were three main finance schemes for large firms in abatement
investment. One scheme used finance programs by the Japan Development Bank (JDB),
which is a government bank under the Ministry of Finance. The JDB had special lend-
ing programs in abatement investment, which offered lower interest rates than mar-
ket rates. This program continued until 1999. The other scheme was conducted by the
Japan Environmental Corporation (JEC) (Kougai Boushi Jiigyoudan) (1965–2003). JEC’s
lending programs for environmental projects ended in 1999. In contrast to the JDB
scheme, the JEC money was targeted at not only large firms but also small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). An example of this is the Japan Corporation for Small and
Medium Enterprise (JASME) (Chusho Kigyo Kinyu Koko) (1953–2008), which was a gov-
ernment bank that specialized in helping SMEs. All three lending programs used the
same strategy of lowering interest rates for investment in abatement technologies, al-
though the level of discount against market rates differed by lending body (discussed
further subsequently).
The policy initiative to use interest rates in this way required the Japanese government
to establish a rate of interest on borrowing between the market rate and the zaito rate (the
rate used for government public finance policy). Any funds borrowed at this cheap rate of
interest were used to finance environmental projects with the aim of alleviating abatement
costs and reducing pollution. The money could be borrowed by large firms from the JDB,
the JEC, or local government bodies. Funding from the JDB ceased in 1999. Funding from
the JEC also finished in 1999 (lending actually stopped in 1998). In part the policy was no
longer possible because of Japan’s zero interest rates from 1998 onward.
The subsidized environmental loan program started in 1960 when the JDB starting mak-
ing loans for investment that would mitigate water pollution. In 1963 this was extended
to loans to help reduce pollution of soot and smoke. Two years later the JEC also started
a loan program for anti-pollution measures followed by the JDB in 1971. In that same
8 See Appendix A for a history of environmental regulation in Japan.
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year the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology set up a subsidy system. The main
developments in what we could call environmental finance were as follows: In 1960 JDB
started loans for investment against water pollution and then in 1963 it started a loan pro-
gram for investment against soot and smoke. In 1965 JEC started its loan program for
anti-pollution investment. In 1971 the JDB also implemented an anti-pollution investment
loan program. This was matched in 1971 by the Agency of Industrial Science and Technol-
ogy, which also set up a subsidy system for anti-pollution investment. Finally, in 1974 the
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology directly subsidized environmental technol-
ogy for NOx reductions.
We now turn to our PCA measure. Japan is a highly centralized country, the central gov-
ernment sets environmental standards and tends to have uniform regulations across the
country. Environmental damages, however, are idiosyncratic across regions and some
cities and villages need more stringent regulations. This led to a number of regional
governments coming to voluntary agreements with local polluting firms, although the
voluntary nature of any agreement means that they could not be legally enforced. The
agreements tended to specify more stringent environmental regulations than the national
laws and regulations and thus no legal penalty could be enforced as long as the national
regulation levels were met. Thus, cities and environmental community groups were re-
quired to supervise the firm’s behavior. One of the most famous examples is Yokohama
city, which signed an agreement with Tokyo Denryoku (TEPCO) in 1965 and with Elec-
tric Power Development Co. Ltd. (Dengen Kaihatsu) in 1964.9 Because firms want to give
the impression of being “greener” and environmentally friendly, PCAs were popular
with firms willing to accept these agreements in the 1970s and 1980s when public disquiet
about the high levels of pollution were at their greatest and as a result so was the threat of
even stricter government regulation.
In our data set the PCA variable is measured as the number of ratified pollution control
municipal agreements signed during a given year (flow data) between a firm/plant and a
local government body. We count the number of agreements in the manufacturing sector,
the agricultural sector, and an overall total (including the energy sector). Figure 1 shows
the number of agreements in the manufacturing sector. The contents of each agreement
depend on the negotiating stance of each municipality and are taken from the Environ-
mental White Paper by the Ministry of Environment Japan for each year from 1972 on-
wards and the Pollution White Paper for years before 1971. As Figure 1 clearly shows, the
number of signed PCAs peaked around 1990 just before the 1993 Basic Law was enacted,
and then fell away dramatically.
9 This is known as a benchmark case, and is now called the Yokohama method (Yokohama houshiki).
The oldest agreement was by the Shimane prefecture with Sanyo Pulp Co. Ltd. and with Daiwabo
Co. Ltd. in 1952.
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Figure 1. Number of PCAs in the manufacturing sector (1982–2002)
Source: Ministry of the Environment (1997).
In terms of our other variables of interest, abatement expenditure is measured as the to-
tal amount of abatement investment per firm taken from the Survey on Anti-pollution
Investment (Kougai Boushi Setsubi Toushi Chosa), conducted by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry, Japan (METI). Per-firm abatement costs are measured by dividing
total abatement investment by the number of firms that engage in abatement investment
of some sort.
Interest rates and lending data for the JDB programs are taken from the JDB Annual Ac-
tivity Report. The interest rate data are for those loans that were provided as part of the
environmental-related investment program promoted by JDB. The JDB program ended
in 1999 because of the reorganization of the Development Bank of Japan, which also has
an environmental investment program (although it operated differently). After 1999 the
environmental interest rates were set at the same level as the market interest rate and thus
any benefit was removed by default. Our second interest rate variable is the rate set by the
JEC programs taken from the JEC Annual Activity Report and is the interest rate that the
JEC set for firms wishing to make environmental investments. The JEC was founded in
1965 and the program also finished in 1999. The JEC was reorganized in 2004 and became
known as the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency. Finally, the inter-
est rates and lending data for the JASME programs are taken from “Fifty Year History of
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JASME.” JASME (Chusho Kigyo Kinyu Koko) was founded in 1953 and specialized in SME
lending for long-run investment. The JASME program finished in 2008.
These lending programs had slightly different targets. According to Lee (1999), JASME
lending was mainly for SMEs; a main target in the JEC program was large compa-
nies, small business, local governments, and semi-public sectors; and the JDB program
aimed at larger companies. Importantly, SMEs were more likely to face financial con-
straints and thus these lending programs were important as a means to encourage
abatement expenditure.10
Each program consists of a number of sub-programs set up to lend money for specific
purposes. These include investment not only in anti-pollution investment, but also
energy-saving technology investment, waste disposal, relocation costs, and the mainte-
nance of parks and greenbelts. Our main focus is on anti-pollution investment and thus
we use abatement cost data only for anti-pollution investments of each program, although
we also briefly consider the impact of energy-saving investment schemes.
Market interest rates and short-term prime lending rates are taken from the Historical
Statistic of Japan (Nihon Chouki Keizai Toukei), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communi-
cations. Unemployment rates and capital utilization (proxies for business cycle effects) are
also taken from the Historical Statistic of Japan (Nihon Chouki Keizai Toukei), Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications.
We include an environmental law dummy that takes a value of unity if the year is after
1993, which was when the Basic Environment Law was enforced. The Basic Environment
Law includes not only pollution controls but also covers global environmental protection
and international cooperation issues and is seen as a turning point in Japanese environ-
mental policy. This partially explains the fall in PCAs following 1993. We also include
data from the METI “Anti-pollution Investment Survey” in our sensitivity analysis. In
terms of coverage, only large firms with more than 10 billion yen in capital were included.
The survey has taken place every year since 1971. We combine data from this survey with
standard macroeconomic variables for Japan from 1971–2005. The data are collected annu-
ally but is non-exhaustive.
10 Each program had a slightly different scope and different lending conditions for a firm to qualify
for abatement investment. See Lee (1999) for details. There might be some concern that the funds
borrowed would not in fact be used for the purposes that the firm initially proposed. This pos-
sibility means that we need to be cautious in our policy prescriptions although as the policy is
administered through bank lending rather than a direct policy usual bank lending policies would
be in place to monitor how the funds were used. It is true, however, that some of the investment
may have led to unsuccessful innovation that was subsequently scrapped and any environmental
benefits lost.
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Figure 2. Interest rates in Japan (1971–2005)
Source: The Historical Statistic of Japan [Nihon Chouki Keizai Toukei], Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
We now present the general trends in abatement costs and interest rate differentials for
the time period in question. Figure 2 shows how interest rates have fallen dramatically
over the past 35 years from a high of 10 percent in the early 1970s to close to zero by 2000.
In those periods of high interest rates a policy of subsidized loans would be attractive to
firms at that time that wanted to undertake environmental innovation.
Of course, the value of an environmental interest rate policy will be determined by the
underlying market interest rate that is open to all firms for investment of any type. To
estimate the effect of this policy on pollution, it is useful to consider the differential be-
tween the market rate of interest and the rate offered by the JDB, the JEC, and JASME. The
results are shown in Figure 3.
As shown, the gap between the market rate of interest and the subsidized rate fell dur-
ing this period from a high of over 2 percent for JASME lending to close to zero on or
around 2000 (although the JASME funding gap rose slightly in the early 2000s just before
the scheme closed).11 In Figure 4 we illustrate the amount of money lent by the three in-
stitutions we consider in this paper. As can be seen, JDB lending was significantly higher
11 The discrepancy for the JASME figures in Figures 2 and 3 is that JASME has a number of different
schemes; the total lending refers to environmental lending whereas the interest rate gap that rose
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Figure 3. The interest rate gaps for JDB, JEC, and JASME (1971–2005)
Source: Annual Activity Report, JDB; Annual Activity Report, JEC; “Fifty Year History of JASME.”
in absolute terms than the others with JASME lending being of a much smaller magni-
tude, no doubt as a result of a remit to lend to SMEs and not the large Japanese conglom-
erates. Again, we can see that the amount provided fell over time from the highs of the
early 1970s.
Figure 5 presents a plot of the average abatement cost paid per firm per year and shows
that the amount of money that firms had to pay for abatement expenditure fell dramati-
cally from the highs of the early 1970s. This was a time when stringent regulations were
introduced and marks the introduction of the environmental interest rate policy.
What we need to remember is that Japanese firms made large investments in the 1970s
and 1980s as they shifted to energy-saving technologies following the oil price shocks in
1973 and again in 1979. Other regulations in Japan at this time also required the payment
of abatement costs. After the 1990s, pollution had fallen considerably and many firms had
already adopted cleaner technologies. Firms also had additional environmental concerns
around recycling and the management of industrial waste. After the Kyoto Protocol in
after 2000 is for other schemes. After 2000 the overall size of the lending programs for JASME was
reduced and simplified.
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Figure 4. Lending by institution (in million yen)
Source: Annual Activity Report, JDB; Annual Activity Report, JEC; and “Fifty Year History of JASME.”
Figure 5. Average abatement cost per firm (million yen in 1990 prices)
Source: Survey on Anti-pollution Investment [Kougai Boushi Setsubi Toushi Chosa], the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan.
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Table 1. Institutional lending and the interest rate gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JDB JEC JASME lending JASME lending
variable lending lending (anti-pollution) (energy-saving)
JDB interest rate gap 3.266∗∗
(1.196)
JEC interest rate gap 0.801∗∗
(0.34)
JASME interest rate gap 0.0252 2.763∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.843)
Constant 8.097∗∗∗ 9.556∗∗∗ 9.602∗∗∗ 8.267∗∗∗
(1.047) (0.416) (0.149) (0.626)
Observations 35 29 29 17
R2 0.133 0.174 0.002 0.306
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1 percent level ∗∗statistically
significant at the 5 percent level; ∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
1997 (ratified in 2005), the global warming agenda related to carbon dioxide emissions
and greenhouse gases was given prominence over concerns of local pollution levels.
We now turn to our econometric analysis, which consists of a number of simple ordinary
least squares regressions with robust standard errors that covers our 30-year period. All
variables are in logs except for the interest rate gap, share variables, and our basic envi-
ronmental law dummy variable. In a series of estimations we examine the role of interest
rate subsidies and PCA agreements on total abatement expenditure and abatement ex-
penditure per firm. We also control for a range of variables that are thought to influence
firm investment, including the unemployment rate, capital utilization, and a measure of
Tobin’s q (to capture macroeconomic cycle effects).
In the first instance we do a quick check to see whether the banking system was working
correctly to the extent that firms borrow more when the interest rate gap increases. The
next stage is to examine whether the government-set rate of interest affects lending and
so we estimate the level of lending by institutions against the interest rate and the interest
rate gap. We then run a series of estimations examining the relationship between abate-
ment expenditure per firm and total expenditure and our environmental policy variables.
Finally, we estimate whether abatement investment contributes to reduced emissions. Us-
ing two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations, decreases in carbon monoxide, Nitrogen
monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and ocean pollution are regressed against
total abatement expenditure, which is determined by lending and a number of macroe-
conomic variables. Table B.1 of Appendix B provides a detailed description of the data.
Table B.2 provides some basic summary statistics.
3. Results
The first estimations investigate the relationship between the government rate of interest
and total lending. The left-hand side of Table 1 is the log of the amount each institution
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Table 2. Impact of interest rate gap on abatement
expenditure per firm (1970–2005)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
JDB interest rate gap 0.284
(0.188)
JEC interest rate gap 0.145
(0.211)
JASME interest rate gap 0.256∗
(0.127)
Capital utilization 0.0167∗∗ 0.0138∗ 0.0203∗∗
(0.00696) (0.00741) (0.00763)
Env law 0.773∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.212) (0.204)
Interest rate 0.122∗∗ 0.0967∗ 0.0794∗
(0.0453) (0.0528) (0.0441)
Unemployment −0.216∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗
(0.0643) (0.0835) (0.0799)
Constant 4.030∗∗∗ 4.501∗∗∗ 3.867∗∗∗
(0.719) (0.688) (0.700)
Observations 35 35 33
R2 0.535 0.494 0.538
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically significant
at the 1 percent level ∗∗statistically significant at the 5 percent level;
∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
lent to firms for each type of environmental investment. The right-hand side includes a
measure of the interest rate gap. Not surprisingly, we find that the larger the gap (the
effective subsidy for environmental investment) the larger the amount lent to firms, al-
though this does not appear to hold for the JASME interest rate gap—suggesting that
SMEs are less price-sensitive. Although our main focus is abatement expenditure, column
4 reports the results for energy-saving investment as a result of the JASME lending pro-
gram. Note that the program for saving energy is more recent (since 1978) and hence the
sample size is much smaller.
In the next stage we investigate the determinants of firm-level abatement expenditure. As
seen in Table 2, only the JASME interest rate gap has a significant impact on firm-level
abatement expenditure. The greater the difference between the central rate of interest and
the subsidized rate of interest, the more additional abatement investment was made by
firms (in this case SMEs following JASME funding). In terms of the other controls, we find
that capital utilization is a positive and significant determinant of abatement expenditure,
suggesting that more is invested in the boom times of the business cycle. Similarly, the
unemployment rate is a negative determinant of abatement expenditure, with a similar
business cycle interpretation. As expected, our environmental law dummy for the years
after 1993 is a positive and significant determinant of firm-level abatement expenditure.
We also find that the market interest rate is a positive determinant of investment.12
12 As part of our robustness checks we also included a measure of Tobin’s q (the ratio between a
physical asset‘s market value and its replacement value) from Piketty and Zucman (2013) as a
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Table 3. Total abatement investment expenditure and institutional
lending (1970–2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
JDB lending 0.0596∗∗ 0.280∗ 0.181
(0.0241) (0.158) (0.111)
JEC lending 0.212∗∗ 0.118 0.148∗
(0.102) (0.115) (0.0823)
JASME lending 0.175 0.0156 0.0404
(0.175) (0.159) (0.101)
Capital utilization −0.00976 −0.0140∗∗ −0.0110 −0.0106
(0.00631) (0.00620) (0.00723) (0.00744)
Env law 0.371∗∗ 0.199 0.355∗∗ 0.462∗
(0.136) (0.166) (0.169) (0.223)
Unemployment rate −0.148 0.149 −0.194∗ −0.0398
(0.101) (0.209) (0.109) (0.281)
Constant 13.28∗∗∗ 11.47∗∗∗ 12.48∗∗∗ 9.250∗∗∗ 8.918∗∗∗
(0.624) (1.351) (1.638) (1.996) (1.592)
Observations 35 29 29 29 29
R2 0.608 0.501 0.333 0.614 0.444
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
In Table 3 we examine the impact of total lending from the three institutions on the total
abatement expenditure of firms where we also control for the interest rate, unemployment
rate, capital utilization, and our environmental law variable. Our results show that total
abatement expenditure is influenced by the 1993 Basic Environmental Law and to some
extent the amount of lending by our two of our three institutions. Again, JASME is in-
significant, which is perhaps not surprising given the small amount of money loaned to
firms (as shown in Figure 3). Both JDB and JEC lending resulted in more abatement ex-
penditure. This suggests that polluting firms spent more on abatement but also borrowed
more money, presumably to spend reducing future pollution.
We now examine the impact of our PCAs or voluntary agreements on abatement expendi-
ture (Table 4). Again, the left side is abatement expenditure per firm. On the right side we
include the number of voluntary agreements as well as our other control variables includ-
ing the number of complaints about pollution to the city offices and government and the
number of environmental laws enacted. Our results show that our PCA agreement vari-
able (whether total or broken down by agriculture or manufacturing) is insignificant. The
main variables of significance in these estimations are the 1993 Basic Environmental Law
dummy and the unemployment rate.
measure of investment environment at the country level. Where significant, our Tobin’s q variable
is negative, suggesting that abatement investment behaves differently to the more usual capital
investment. The other results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. Results are available
upon request. At the firm level, Tobin’s q is included as a measure of financial performance, but
few studies find a causal relationship between emissions and financial performance.
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Table 4. Abatement expenditure per firm and
PCA (1970–98)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
PCA total agreements 0.108 −0.00977
(0.218) (0.387)
PCA manufacturing 0.140
(0.228)
PCA agriculture −0.0146
(0.151)
Unemployment −0.256∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.370
(0.0638) (0.0589) (0.343)
Capital utilization 0.000476 0.00103 −0.00743
(0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0533)
Env law 0.791∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.895∗∗
(0.354) (0.338) (0.344)
Interest rate 0.0634 0.0613 0.0661
(0.0635) (0.0514) (0.0667)
Claims 0.115
(1.061)
Env_law_number 0.371
(2.425)
Env gov budget share −0.217
(0.738)
Constant 5.136∗∗∗ 5.248∗∗∗ 5.001
(1.450) (1.462) (11.59)
Observations 21 21 21
R2 0.680 0.677 0.687
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level ∗∗statistically significant at the 5 percent
level; ∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
In Table 5 we examine the effect of PCAs on total abatement cost expenditure. The coef-
ficients on our PCA variables are rather inconsistent and generally insignificant. Again,
our environmental regulation dummy is a positive and significant determinant of total
abatement expenditure. Our other controls are broadly similar. The number of regulations
and the number of claims to local government are all insignificant determinants of total
abatement investment.
As part of our sensitivity checks we also undertook a series of robustness checks includ-
ing using pollution variables instead of abatement expenditure and the results were
broadly similar.
Overall, PCAs have a weak impact on total and per-firm abatement expenditure. We can
interpret this in two ways. First, although some specific cases such as Yokohama city were
considered to be successful (as shown by previous studies), PCAs overall do not appear
to have had a significant impact. Second, our PCA variables might be not perfectly mea-
sured as we only count the number of PCAs and do not take into account the size and
scope of the PCAs.
Finally, Table 6 reports the impact of total abatement expenditure on air and ocean pol-
lution. Because, as mentioned earlier, abatement expenditure is endogenous, we utilize
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Table 5. Total abatement investment and PCAs (1970–98)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Model 1 Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
PCA total agreements 0.226∗ −0.236 −0.219
(0.111) (0.148) (0.209)
PCA manufacturing 0.384∗ −0.109
(0.208) (0.121)
PCA agriculture −0.178 −0.189∗∗
(0.162) (0.0820)
Unemployment −0.426∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0433) (0.148)
Capital utilization −0.0308∗∗∗ −0.0294∗∗∗ −0.0533∗∗
(0.00820) (0.00754) (0.0205)
Env law 0.776∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.131) (0.150)
Interest rate 0.0579∗∗ 0.0327 0.0402
(0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0235)
Claims −0.590
(0.475)
Env_law_number 1.449
(1.044)
Env gov budget share 0.0297
(0.309)
Constant 10.90∗∗∗ 11.10∗∗∗ 17.92∗∗∗ 17.99∗∗∗ 22.58∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.760) (0.728) (0.875) (5.133)
Observations 21 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.212 0.140 0.898 0.868 0.907
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6. Impact of abatement expenditure on emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nitric Nitrogen Sulfur Carbon Ocean
Variable oxide dioxide dioxide monoxide pollution
Abatement costs −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.042)
Constant 0.024∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 2.45335∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.868) (0.526)
Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ∗statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
2SLS and use Model 4 in Table 3 as the first stage. In the second stage, the change in emis-
sion levels from t–1 to t is regressed on total abatement expenditure at t–1. The coeffi-
cients on abatement expenditure are all negative and significant, suggesting that as abate-
ment expenditure increases, emissions are reduced.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we examined various aspects of Japanese environmental policy. Although
our results show that the implementation of the Basic Environmental Law in 1993 was
important in reducing Japan’s high emissions levels, we also find that Japan’s innova-
tive strategy of having interest rate subsidies for firms wanting to borrow to invest in
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clean technologies also had a small but positive effect on firms’ ability to reduce pollution.
Hence, Japan’s interest rate policy appeared to work in that the larger the interest rate
gap, the larger the abatement investment (although this was only significant for lending
to SMEs from JASME). This result is despite the relatively low interest rate gap, which fell
further as Japan entered a long period of low interest rates from the financial crash at the
end of the 1980s. A note of caution is that, although the lending was carefully monitored
by the lending institution, it is possible that suboptimal investment took place or that the
abatement technologies were later scrapped and any environmental benefits were lost.
When we examined the impact of PCAs, our results showed no evidence that the use of
PCAs had any effect on firm expenditure on pollution abatements. This might reflect the
nature of the agreement, which might be to limit emissions to current levels or to agree
not to increase emissions beyond certain limits. These agreements were also only signed
with a small number of large firms, so the aggregate impact may well have been masked
when we consider large numbers of firms.
Although our results show that using a type of green financing such as interest rate reduc-
tions for abatement investment can be an effective environmental policy, they might not
be directly applicable to the current environmental concerns faced by China and India.
In the time since our period of analysis the world has seen considerable growth in global
supply chains and the fragmentation of production. This means individual multinational
corporations may be more sensitive to government regulation and move production to
low-regulation countries (a pollution haven effect). Hence, the use of stringent environ-
mental policy could have a detrimental impact on local employment and competitiveness.
This suggests that the use of carrots, such as an environmental interest rate policy or other
green deal financing options, might be a more business-friendly solution to both local and
global pollution problems even though the low interest rate environment experienced by
many countries will limit the effectiveness of such policies.13
There are other reasons why our results need to be treated with caution when consider-
ing solutions to the current global environmental problems. First, since the 1970s there
have been dramatic improvements in technology (and environmental technology), which
means that abatement investment may be cheaper and more effective at least in certain
heavy industrial sectors (a technique effect). Nevertheless, the scale of growth in many
13 In the current globalized world, pollution havens have been found in Asia, in which pollution
intensive production locates in countries with lax environmental regulations. See, for example,
Cole, Elliott, and Okubo (2010). Waste havens have also been found, where industrial waste is
exported to China without recycling (Okubo, Watabe, and Furuyama 2016). However, also for
Asia, Ramstetter et al. (2013) find that for Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, foreign MNEs were
not statistically more energy efficient than domestic firms suggesting that attracting multinational
enterprises should not be driven by a desire to improve overall energy efficiency.
83 Asian Economic Papers
Ecological Modernization in Japan: The Role of Interest Rate Subsidies and Voluntary Pollution Control Agreements
industrializing countries means that demand for energy and consumption goods is likely
to continue to outweigh any technique effect. Second, as we saw in Paris in 2015, there is a
strong move toward establishing workable global environmental agreements to tackle cli-
mate change, which will have abatement investment at the heart of the solution. Finally,
we are in a world of environmentally aware global consumers, especially in the West,
who demand environmentally friendly goods and products. This means that stringent
regulations are not required as firms will increasingly use self-regulation when it becomes
apparent that being green sells. Overall, it could be argued that the trade-off between eco-
nomic growth and environment is not as severe as that faced by Japan in the 1970s.
In future research we want to look more closely at the firm-level determinants of abate-
ment expenditure to examine how firm size, ownership, global engagement (importing
and exporting), and access to finance affect a firm’s decision to investment in abatement
technologies. The relationship between access to credit and environmental investments
is an important area of research as governments around the world attempt to meet in-
creasingly stringent emissions targets, especially in the area of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gas emissions.
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Appendix A: History of Japanese Environmental Policy
These tables are an extension of Lee (1999, Table 2, p. 34).
Table A.1 Regulations and laws
1962 Smoke and Soot Regulation Law (–1968)
1967 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution –1993)
1968 Air Pollution Control Law (SOx K-value Regulation)
Noise Regulation Law
1970 Water Pollution Control Law
Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law
1971 Environmental Agency
Toxic metal regulations (BOD, COD, SS)
SOx K-value Regulation (third revision)
Offensive Odor Control Law
1972 SOx K-value Regulation (fourth revision)
The Nature Conservation Law
1973 Law Concerning Pollution-related Health Damage Compensation and other Measures
1974 SOx Total Pollutant Load Control
1975 NOx density regulation (second revision)
1977 NOx density regulation (third revision)
1978 Total Pollutant Load Control (water pollution)
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Table A.1 Continued.
1979 Law Regarding the Rationalization of Energy Use
1981 NOx Total Pollutant Load Control
1988 Law Concerning the Protection of the Ozone Layer through the Control of Specified Substances
and Other Measures
1989 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
1990 Environmental Labelling System (Eco-mark)
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (sign in 1992 and ratify in 1993)
Law Concerning Special Measures for Total Emission Reduction of Nitrogen Oxides and
Particulate Matter from Automobiles
1993 Basic Environment Law
1994 Basic Environment Plan
1997 Kyoto Protocol (COP3)
Environment Impact Assessment Law
1998 Law for Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances
1999 Law Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins
2000 Basic Law for Establishing the Recycling-based Society
2001 Total Pollutant Load Control (fifth revision)
Ministry of Environment was formed from the sub-cabinet level
2003 Basic Plan for Establishing the Recycling-based Society
Source: Lee (1999).
Note: BOD = biochemical oxygen demand; COD = chemical oxygen demand; NOx = nitrogen oxides; SOx = sulphur oxides;
SS = suspended solids.
Table A.2 Main diseases related
to pollution
1955 Itai-itai disease
1956 Minamata disease
1965 Niigata Minamata disease
1960–1972 Yokkaichi asthma
Source: Lee (1999).
Appendix B: Data
Table B.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Definition/Source
PCA total agreements,
PCA manufacturing,
PCA agriculture
The number of ratified pollution control agreements coming into force during the year (flow
data). The number of agreements ratified between a firm/plant and the local regulatory
body.
Agreements on pollution control between local governments and firms. We count the
number by manufacturing sector firms excluding agreements in the agriculture, electricity
and energy sectors. The content of any agreement depends on the situation in each
location and are thus more flexible than governmental regulations and environmental
laws.
Source: “Environmental White Paper”, the Ministry of Environment Japan, each year from
1972 and the “Pollution White Paper” before 1971.
JDB interest (percent) Measures the interest rate for loans as part of the environmental related investment program
promoted by the JDB.
Source: Annual Activity Report, JDB.
JEC interest (percent) Measures the JEC interest rate for loans related to environmental investment.
Source: Annual Activity Report, JEC
JASME interest (percent) Measures the JASME (1953–2008) interest rate for loans for environmental investment.
Source: “Fifty Year History of JASME”, JASME.
JDB interest rate gap
JEC interest rate gap
Measures the gap between the JDB (JEC, JASME) interest rate and the equivalent market
interest rate. Market interest rates are recorded as the short-term prime lending rate.
JASME interest rate gap Source: The Historical Statistics of Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
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Table B.1 Continued.
Variable Definition/Source
JDB lending
JEC lending
Total amount of loans by JDB (JEC, JASME) for environmental investment (unit: million
yen).
JASME lending
(anti-pollution)
(saving-energy)
“Fifty Year History of JASME”; Annual Activity Report, JDB; Annual Activity Report, JEC.
Abatement costs per firm Abatement costs per firm. This is average abatement costs (total abatement costs divided by
the number of firms which spend anti-pollution investment).
Source: “Survey on Anti-pollution Investment”, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
Japan.
Abatement costs Total abatement costs (macro-level abatement costs).
Source: “Survey on Anti-pollution Investment”, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
Japan.
Env gov budget share
(from 0 to 1)
Measures the portion of environmental conservation expenditure in the national budget.
Environmental conservation expenditure is divided by the national budget.
Env Law Dummy after enforcement of the Basic Environment Law (1993).
Claims Number of claims on pollution to city offices and government.
Source: Historical Statistic of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
Capital utilization Operation ratio. If a firm operates at 100 percent the index is given a value of 100.
Source: Historical Statistic of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate.
(percent) Source: Historical Statistic of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan
Interest rate Market interest rate. Long-run prime interest rate.
Env_law_number Number of anti-pollution laws and regulations.
CO, NO1, NO2, SO2 Air pollution (ppm).
Source: Historical Statistic of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
Oceanpollution The number of confirmed cases of sea pollution.
Source: Historical Statistic of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
Table B.2 Summary statistics
Mean Std Min Max
Abatement per firm 5.778527 0.375924 5.145427 6.611792
Abatement total 12.68904 0.458674 11.67776 13.77937
JDB interest rate gap 0.357143 0.480371 −0.3 1.5
JEC interest rate gap 0.568571 0.626274 −0.3 1.7
JASME interest rate gap 0.934849 0.798386 −0.3 2.6
JDB lending 9.262965 4.306151 0 12.23304
JEC lending 10.10584 1.203566 4.532599 11.74798
JASME lending (anti-pollution) 9.626878 0.446608 8.402679 10.57839
JASME lending (saving energy) 9.478218 2.099488 6.122493 11.63051
PCA manufacturing 6.751969 0.47264 6.040255 7.590347
Env govt budget share 1.239714 0.225864 0.68 1.64
Env law 0.371429 0.490241 0 1
SO2 0.008371 0.005688 0.004 0.027
NO1 0.0128857 0.005875 0.008 0.041
NO2 0.018029 0.005549 0.014 0.044
CO 0.8971429 0.5798 0.4 2.7
Claims 11.22746 0.141696 11.02458 11.51615
Ocean pollution 6.894057 0.4928801 6.052089 7.807917
Env law number 2.934897 0.393889 1.386294 3.218876
PCA agriculture 103.0476 68.02094 30 357
Capital utilization 87.48 13.52222 55.5 102
Unemployment rate 2.871429 1.192272 1.2 5.4
Note: All variables are in logs except dummy, ratio, and share variables.
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